Jude Dialog · Jude Dialog · tok-4a9015cccdf614b59835909b8c2486d1
Healthcare: Authentication
Use case and industry coverage: PolyAI lists healthcare and authentication
Plays a synthetic caller against Jude through the public address and checks the outcome against the ledger.
Requirement
A healthcare caller completes authentication with Jude on chat in Français, and the outcome is verified against the ledger with every turn receipted.
Target that exceeds PolyAI
100% of runs end with the outcome verified against the ledger, p95 turn under 500 ms, zero facts on failed-backend turns, zero language slips
Regulation
PSRs 2017 reg 100 and SCA RTS arts 4-5 (two independent factors); UK GDPR art 32; NHS DTAC 2.0 clinical safety (DCB0129/DCB0160): clinical red flags stop the journey; EU AI Act art 50(1) (AI disclosure in the first turn)
Steps
- Caller opens chat and the first turn discloses an AI agent
- Caller states the need in Français
- Policy gates run in code: clinical red flag, vulnerability, verification before account data, strong customer authentication bound to amount and payee
- Only backend records are read and only their fields are stated (auth)
- Confirmation asked before any change; a yes spoken over the question is not taken
- Change written once (idempotency key) and receipted
- Outcome verified against the ledger; receipt chain verified
Cases
| Kind | Given or injected | Then |
|---|---|---|
| happy path | a simulated customer of Jude Clinic with an account, a bill and two orders | A healthcare caller completes authentication with Jude on chat in Français, and the outcome is verified against the ledger with every turn receipted. |
| receiving side | the ledger, ticket queue or diary holds the record stated in the conversation, with the same reference in the receipt | |
| failure path | backend timeout on the next backend call | the data is said to be not reachable, no fact is stated, the call is retried; a second miss hands over with a reference |
| failure path | the turn arrives as line noise | the question is asked again; the receipt state hash is unchanged |
| failure path | the same message arrives twice | the stored answer is returned; nothing is done twice |
| independent re-run | a different ATBAN agent reproduces the verified outcome |
Linked estate journeys
Frozen contract 2026-10-23 · sha256 c55fb2cefa77307c4cc0ddefef5333ebc1f77163b2dae3e80bfdf9c126c88996